Muistaako joku henkisesti tasapainottomien lentäjien aiheuttamia onnettomuuksia?
Itselleni tulee mieleen Teneriffan tapaus, jossa kapteeni aloitti nousukiidon, vaikka oma perämies oli radioliikenteen perusteella todennut toisen koneen olevan edessä kiitotiellä ja ilmoittanut asiasta kapteenille. Siis nousee suoraan päin kiitotiellä rullaavaa konetta! Vaikka teko ei ilmeisesti ollut tahallinen, niin voiko enää sen sairaampi ihminen päätyä matkustajakoneen pilotiksi. Kuka lähtee nousuu, jos kollega sanoo, ettei kiitotie ole vapaa? Jos se ei ole täysjärkiselle lentäjälle riittävä peruste nousun keskeyttämiselle, niin mikä sitten. Tietenkin 583 ruumista oli näyttävä finaali pitkälle uralle.
Itselleni tulee mieleen Teneriffan tapaus, jossa kapteeni aloitti nousukiidon, vaikka oma perämies oli radioliikenteen perusteella todennut toisen koneen olevan edessä kiitotiellä ja ilmoittanut asiasta kapteenille. Siis nousee suoraan päin kiitotiellä rullaavaa konetta! Vaikka teko ei ilmeisesti ollut tahallinen, niin voiko enää sen sairaampi ihminen päätyä matkustajakoneen pilotiksi. Kuka lähtee nousuu, jos kollega sanoo, ettei kiitotie ole vapaa? Jos se ei ole täysjärkiselle lentäjälle riittävä peruste nousun keskeyttämiselle, niin mikä sitten. Tietenkin 583 ruumista oli näyttävä finaali pitkälle uralle.
Vastaukset 9
Vanhimmat
onhan näitä järjettömyyksiä ollut, mm. jenkeissä jossa siirtolennolla ollet lentäjät päättivät hieman "kokeilla" mitä koneella voi tehdä, jonka seurauksena moottorien sammuminen ja maahansyöksy, onneksi ei ollut matkustajia täynnä...
Joitain vuosia sitten Jenkeistä lähtenyt Egypt Airin kone syöksyi Atlanttiin USA:n rannikon edustalalle. Perämies oli päättänyt tehdä itsemurhan kun kippari oli veskissä...
Tuon Teneriffan tapauksen syystä mielestäni teit melkoisen yleistyksen ... suosittelen lukemaan linkin http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenerife_disaster
____________________
Josta ohessa osa:
Probable cause
While there is debate about their relative importance, the general conclusion is that the disaster was caused partly by:
the fact that the KLM Captain did not interrupt take-off when Pan Am reported that they were still on the runway.
In reply to the flight engineer's query as to whether the Pan Am airplane had already left the runway, replied emphatically in the affirmative.
squelched radio messages (calls from both planes to the tower and vice versa canceled each other because they happened to be at precisely the same instant)
the use of non-standard phrases used by the KLM co-pilot ("We're at take off") and the Tenerife control tower ("O.K."),
the fact that the Pan Am crew continued along the runway instead of turning at exit C3, as directed.
Speculations
There has been speculation of other, albeit unverifiable, possible contributing factors.
Van Zanten was known as a first-class pilot, and even was the preferred pilot for publicity, such as KLM magazine ads. The flight was one of the few after spending six months training new pilots on a flight simulator. Some experts claim in time he might have developed some kind of governance attitude as a consequence of having been in charge of everything at the simulator (including simulated ATC), which is another reason suggested for van Zanten not confirming the instructions from the tower.
The possibility that Captain van Zanten was in a hurry to commence the delayed flight due to Dutch regulations on exceeding crew duty hours.
The deteriorating weather conditions could prevent the flight from taking off at all, and the airliner would be forced to stay on Los Rodeos, with financial consequences for KLM.
Changes in airline regulations
As a consequence of the accident, there were sweeping changes made to international airline regulations and to airplanes. Aviation authorities around the world introduced requirements for standard phrases. Cockpit procedures were also changed. Hierarchical relations among crewmembers were played down. More emphasis was placed on decision-making by mutual agreement. This is known in the industry as crew resource management, and is now standard training in all major airlines.
Due to the frequent and dangerous fogs that cover the area around Los Rodeos airport in the North of the island, a second airport was built in the South of the Island: the new Reina Sofía Airport. This airport serves the majority of Tenerife's domestic and international commercial flights.
============================
APP = Tenerife tower
RDO-2 = Pan Am Radio communications (co-pilot)
CAM-1 = Cockpit Area Mike PanAm (captain)
CAM-2 = Cockpit Area Mike PanAm (co-pilot)
CAM-3 = Cockpit Area Mike PanAm (flight engineer)
KLM = KLM Radio Communications
KLM-1 = KLM Cockpit Area Mike (captain)
KLM-2 = KLM Cockpit Area Mike (co-pilot)
KLM-3 = KLM Cockpit Area Mike (flight engineer)
Time: Source: Content:
1701:57.0 RDO-2 Tenerife the Clipper one seven three six. (1702:00.2)
1702:01.8 APP Clipper one seven three six Tenerife.
1702:03.6 RDO-2 Ah- We were instructed to contact you and also to taxi down the runway, is that correct? (1702:07.4)
1702:08.4 APP Affirmative, taxi into the runway and -ah leave the runway third, third to your left, (background conversation in the tower).
1702:16.4 RDO-2 Third to the left, O.K. (17:02.18.3)
1702:18.4 CAM-3 Third he said.
CAM-? Three.
1702:20.6 APP -ird one to your left.
1702:21.9 CAM-1 I think he said first.
1702:26.4 CAM-2 I'll ask him again.
CAM-? * * *
1702:32.2 CAM-2 Left turn.
1702:33.1 CAM-1 I don't think they have take-off minimums anywhere right now.
1702:39.2 CAM-1 What really happened over there today?
1702:41.6 CAM-4 They put a bomb (in) the terminal, Sir, right where the check-in counters are.
1702:46.6 CAM-1 Well we asked them if we could hold and -uh- I guess you got the word, we landed here **
CAM-? * * *
1702:49.8 APP KLMfour eight zero five how many taxiway -ah- did you pass?
1702:55.6 KLM I think we just passed charlie four now.
1702:59.9 APP O.K. ... at the end of the runway make one eighty and report -ah- ready -ah- for ATC clearance (background conversation in the tower).
1703:09.3 CAM-2 The first one is a ninety degree turn.
1703:11.0 CAM-1 Yeah, O.K.
1703:12.1 CAM-2 Must be the third ... I'll ask him again.
1703:14.2 CAM-1 O.K.
1703:16.6 CAM-1 We could probably go in it's ah ...
1703:19.1 CAM-1 You gotta make a ninety degree turn.
1703:21.6 CAM-1 Yeah, uh.
1703:21.6 CAM-2 Ninety degree turn to get around this ... this one down here it's a forty five.
1703:29.3 RDO-2 Would you confirm that you want the clipper one seven three six to turn left at the third intersection? (1703:35.4).
1703:35.1 CAM-1 One, two.
1703:36.4 APP The third one, sir, one; two, three, third, third one (1703:38.3)..
1703:38.3 CAM-? One two (four).
1703:39.0 CAM-1 Good.
1703:40.1 CAM-1 That's what we need right, the third one.
1703:42.9 CAM-3 Uno, dos, tres.
1703:44.0 CAM-1 Uno, dos, tres.
1703:44.9 CAM-3 Tres - uh - si.
1703:46.5 CAM-1 Right.
1703:47.6 CAM-3 We'll make it yet.
1703:47.6 APP ...er seven one three six report leaving the runway.
1703:49.1 CAM-2 Wing flaps?
1703:50.2 CAM-1 Ten, indicate ten, leading edge lights are green.
1703:54.1 CAM-? Get that.
1703:55.0 RDO-2 Clipper one seven three six (1703:56.4)
1703:56.5 CAM-2 Yaw damp and instrument?
1703:58.6 CAM-1 Ah- Bob we'll get a left one *
1703:59.3 CAM-2 I got a left.
1704:00.6 CAM-1 Did you?
1704.00.9 CAM-2 And -ah- need a right.
1704:02.6 CAM-1 I'll give you a little *
1704:03.8 CAM-2 Put a little aileron in this thing.
1704:05.0 CAM-1 O.K., here's a left and I'll give you a right one right here.
1704:09.7 CAM-1 O.K. right turn right and left yaw.
1704:11.4 CAM-2 Left yaw checks.
1704:12.4 CAM-1 O.K., here's the rudders.
1704:13.6 CAM-1 Here's two left, centre, two right centre.
1704:17.8 CAM-2 Checks.
1704:19.2 CAM-2 Controls.
1704:19.6 CAM-1 Haven't seen any yet!
1704:20.3 CAM-2 I haven't either.
1704:21. 7 CAM-1 They're free, the indicators are checked.
1704:24.6 CAM-2 There's one.
1704:25.8 CAM-1 There's one.
1704:26.4 CAM-1 That's the ninety degree.
1704:28.5 CAM-? O.K.
1704:34.5 CAM-? ***
CAM-2 Weight and balance finals?
1704:37.7 CAM (Sounds similar to stabilizer trim).(1704:44.8)
1704:37.2 CAM-1 We were gonna put that on four and a half
1704:39.8 CAM-3 We got four and a half and we weigh five thirty four (sound of stabilizer trim).
1704:44.6 CAM-2 Four and a half on the right.
1704:46.8 CAM-2 Engineer's taxi check.
1704:48.4 CAM-3 Taxi check is complete.
1704:50.5 CAM-2 Take-off and departure briefing?
1704:52.1 CAM-1 O.K., it'll be standard, we gonna go straight out there till we get thirty five hundred feet then we're gonna make that reversal and go back' out to * fourteen.
1704:58.2 APP -m eight seven zero five and clipper one seven ... three six, for your information, the centre line lighting is out of service. (APP transmission is readable but slightly broken.)
1705:05.8 KLM I copied that.
1705:07.7 RDO-2 Clipper one seven three six.
1705:09.6 CAM-1 We got centre line markings (* only) (could be "don't we) they count the same thing as ... we need eight hundred metres if you don't have that centre line... I read that on the back (of this) just a while ago.
1705:22.0 CAM-1 That's two.
1705:23.5 CAM-3 Yeh, that's forty-five there.
1705:25.7 CAM-1 Yeh.
1705:26.5 CAM-2 That's this one right here.
1705:27.2 CAM-1 (Yeh)I know.
1705:28.1 CAM-3 O.K.
1705:28.5 CAM-3 Next one is almost a forty-five, huh yeh.
1705:30.6 CAM-1 But it goes...
1705:32.4 CAM-1 Yeh, but it goes ... ahead, I think (it's) gonna put us on (the) taxiway.
1705:35.9 CAM-3 Yeah, just a little bit yeh.
1705:39.8 CAM-? O.K., for sure.
1705:40.0 CAM-2 Maybe he, maybe he counts these (are) three.
CAM-? Huh.
1705:44.8 CAM-? I like this.
1705:44.8 KLM Uh, the KLM ... four eight zero five is now ready for take-off ... uh and we're waiting for our ATC clearance.
1705:53.4 APP KLM eight seven * zero five uh you are cleared to the Papa Beacon climb to and maintain flight level nine zero right turn after take-off proceed with heading zero four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR. (1706:08.2)
1706:09.6 KLM Ah roger, sir, we're cleared to the Papa Beacon flight level nine zero, right turn out zero four zero until intercepting the three two five and we're now (at take-off). (1706:17.9)
ca. 1706:13 KLM-1 We gaan. (We're going)
1706:18.19 APP OK.
1706:19.3 RDO No .. eh.
1706:20.08 APP Stand by for take-off, I will call you.
1706:20.3 RDO And we're still taxiing down the runway, the clipper one seven three six.
1706:19.39 - 1706:23.19 RDO and APP communications caused a shrill noise in KLM cockpit - messages not heard by KLM crew.
1706:25.6 APP Roger alpha one seven three six report when runway clear
1706:29.6 RDO OK, we'll report when we're clear.
APP Thank you
1706:32.43 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af dan? {Is he not clear then?}
1706:34.1 KLM-1 Wat zeg je? {What do you say?}
1706:34.15 KLM-? Yup.
1706:34.7 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af, die Pan American? {Is he not clear that Pan American?}
1706:35.7 KLM-1 Jawel. {Oh yes. - emphatic}
1706:40 PanAm captain sees landinglights of KLM Boeing at approx. 700m
1706:44 PH-BUF started rotation
1706:47.44 KLM-1 [Scream]
1706:50 collision
Kunnon muslimi ei tee itsemurhaa. Näin väittivät egyptiläiset onnettomuustutkijat. Onnettomuuden syy oli siis tekninen vika tai lentäjän toimintakyvyttömyys.
Amerikkalaiset tutkimukseen osallistuneet asiantuntijat kyselivät useaan kertaan, että eikö yhtään viittaa itsemurhaan se, että kone yhtäkkiä työnnettiin nolla-G tilaan minuutti sen jälkeen kun kippari oli mennyt vessaan (mahtoi olla paskat niskassa), tai se, että matkalla alakertaan perämies kiljui 38 kertaa peräkkäin "ALLAH ON SUURIN!!!".
(Saatan muistella väärin)
Ohjaamosta kuultiin rukouksen ääniä. Tehot täysillä, kone ylitti itse asiassa äänennopeuden pystysyöksyssä, lienee konetyypin nopeusennätys.
Yleistys normaalisti tarkoittaa, että yksittäisistä tapauksista vedetään suurempaa kohderyhmää koskevia johtopäätöksiä. Minä puhuin koko ajan yksittäisestä tapauksesta ja sitä seuranneesta onnettomuudesta.
Osoittiko mielestäsi hyvää harkintaa KLM:n kapteenilta lähteä nousuun tarkistamatta radiolla tilannetta. Hyvänen aika! Perämies kysyy lentoon lähtevältä kapteenilta kahdesti, eiks toinen kone ole vielä kiitotiellä ja kapteeni päättää aiheuttaa historian suurimman lento-onnettomuuden asian tarkistamisen sijasta. Kopioin relevantit rivit. Miten sinä asian yleistäisit?
1706:29.6 RDO OK, we'll report when we're clear.
APP Thank you
1706:32.43 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af dan? {Is he not clear then?}
1706:34.1 KLM-1 Wat zeg je? {What do you say?}
1706:34.15 KLM-? Yup.
1706:34.7 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af, die Pan American? {Is he not clear that Pan American?}
1706:35.7 KLM-1 Jawel. {Oh yes. - emphatic}
1706:40 PanAm captain sees landinglights of KLM Boeing at approx. 700m
1706:44 PH-BUF started rotation
1706:47.44 KLM-1 [Scream]
1706:50 collision
Kyllä oli silläkin pojalla lepakoita ullakolla...
Mutta pääsipä vaan Moskovaan. Se oli surkea päivä Neuvostoliiton ilmapuolustukselle.
Muttei aiheuttanut lento-onnettomuutta, vaikka laskeutuminen torille kaiketi voidaan laskea vaaratilanteeksi ja onnettomuudelta vältyttiin ehkä vain hyvällä onnella. Saatiinko muuten koskaan selville, oliko kyseessä vain nuorukaisen jäynä, vai oliko kyseessä harkitumpi operaatio. Jos tarkoitus oli oikeasti selvittää NL:n ilmapuolustuksen tila jollekin toimeksiantajalle, kuten aikoinaan huhuttiin, niin kyse lienee ollut harkitusta riskinotosta.
se teneriffan kenttä on sitten niin helekutin ahdas ainakin alastullessa..mitään väistövaraa ei ole
Sen takia lentäjien on tarkoitus noudattaa lennonjohdon ohjeita, ettei kiitotiellä tarvi väistellä koneita. Kiitotiellä väistäminen johtaa aina onnettomuuteen, suurempaan tai pienempään. Laskeuduttaessa ainoa turvallinen tapa väistää on keskeyttää lasku ajoissa ja ottaa korkeutta.