Kurskin taistelusta 62 vuotta!

http://www.wsoy.fi/index.jsp?c=product&isbn=951-0-28344-4

Kannattaa lukea.

kärsivät Kurskin taistelussa teknisistä ongelmista mm.vaihteisto, voimansiirto ja konerikoista- ja tulipaloista. Noin 250 pantterista (D-malli) vain nelisenkymmentä oli enää käyttökelpoisia kurskin operaation jälkeen elokuussa.

Igor kirjoitti:

kärsivät Kurskin taistelussa teknisistä ongelmista mm.vaihteisto, voimansiirto ja konerikoista- ja tulipaloista. Noin 250 pantterista (D-malli) vain nelisenkymmentä oli enää käyttökelpoisia kurskin operaation jälkeen elokuussa.

Lue lisää

Ihailtavaa teidän kummankin asiantuntemus saksalaispanssarivaunujen teknisten yksityiskohtien suhteen. Tuonkaltainen tietämys ei ole ikinä ollut vahva alueeni. Kirjoitan mieluimmin aiheesta "miksi-tapahtui" yrittäen ymmärtää laajoja kokonaisuuksia, kuin "miten-tapahtui" yrittämättäkään käsittää tiettyjen panssarivaunujen tyyppieroja.

Jokainen on hyvä jollakin mielenkiintoiseksi katsomallaan alueella. Kukaan ei ole hyvä kaikessa.

Igor kirjoitti:

kärsivät Kurskin taistelussa teknisistä ongelmista mm.vaihteisto, voimansiirto ja konerikoista- ja tulipaloista. Noin 250 pantterista (D-malli) vain nelisenkymmentä oli enää käyttökelpoisia kurskin operaation jälkeen elokuussa.

Lue lisää

Ja siksi D malli korvattiinkin sitten A mallilla.
Mutta tulivoima (75 mm, 70 cal tykki) ja voimakas ja T-34:tä imitoitu viisto panssari suojasivat venäläisten kanuunoilta.

aito-arska kirjoitti:

Ihailtavaa teidän kummankin asiantuntemus saksalaispanssarivaunujen teknisten yksityiskohtien suhteen. Tuonkaltainen tietämys ei ole ikinä ollut vahva alueeni. Kirjoitan mieluimmin aiheesta "miksi-tapahtui" yrittäen ymmärtää laajoja kokonaisuuksia, kuin "miten-tapahtui" yrittämättäkään käsittää tiettyjen panssarivaunujen tyyppieroja.

Jokainen on hyvä jollakin mielenkiintoiseksi katsomallaan alueella. Kukaan ei ole hyvä kaikessa.

Lue lisää

Jep lapsena luin tollasia yksityiskohtia ja kun vähän viisastuin rupesin lukeen suurempia kokonaisuuksia. Lue aiheesta aspergerin syndrooma, jos ihmettelet tietoja tankeista ja muusta.

aito-arska kirjoitti:

Ihailtavaa teidän kummankin asiantuntemus saksalaispanssarivaunujen teknisten yksityiskohtien suhteen. Tuonkaltainen tietämys ei ole ikinä ollut vahva alueeni. Kirjoitan mieluimmin aiheesta "miksi-tapahtui" yrittäen ymmärtää laajoja kokonaisuuksia, kuin "miten-tapahtui" yrittämättäkään käsittää tiettyjen panssarivaunujen tyyppieroja.

Jokainen on hyvä jollakin mielenkiintoiseksi katsomallaan alueella. Kukaan ei ole hyvä kaikessa.

Lue lisää

Minulla on sellainen kuva, että Länsiliittoutuneiden ilmavoimat pommittivat Saksan teollisuuslaitoksia jo aivan sodan alusta lähtien, ja kun ne saivat ilmaylivoiman 1942 kuluessa ei ollut mitään estettä.
Eli Saksan saavutukset siihen nähden, että heidän tuotantolaitoksensa kärsivät jatkuvista pommituksista oli hieno saavutus. en sano tätä ihaillakseni natseja, vaan saksalaista tietotaitoa.

NL:n tuotantolaitokset taas olivat Uralin takana turvassa pommituksilta.

kesämies kirjoitti:

Minulla on sellainen kuva, että Länsiliittoutuneiden ilmavoimat pommittivat Saksan teollisuuslaitoksia jo aivan sodan alusta lähtien, ja kun ne saivat ilmaylivoiman 1942 kuluessa ei ollut mitään estettä.
Eli Saksan saavutukset siihen nähden, että heidän tuotantolaitoksensa kärsivät jatkuvista pommituksista oli hieno saavutus. en sano tätä ihaillakseni natseja, vaan saksalaista tietotaitoa.

NL:n tuotantolaitokset taas olivat Uralin takana turvassa pommituksilta.

Lue lisää

Teollisuuslaitoksia Saksassa ei tosin pommitettu "aivan sodan alusta lähtien". Ensimmäiset RAF:n pommitukset Saksaan muistaakseni tapahtuivat vuoden -40 syksyllä. Silloin osoituksena saksalaisille asenteella "will newer surrender" kuin päämääränä tuhota sotatarviketeollisuus. Strategiset pommitukset "bomber-Harrisin" komennossa alkoivat talvella 42-43. Raskain RAF:n tappioin.

vodjakki kirjoitti:

Jep lapsena luin tollasia yksityiskohtia ja kun vähän viisastuin rupesin lukeen suurempia kokonaisuuksia. Lue aiheesta aspergerin syndrooma, jos ihmettelet tietoja tankeista ja muusta.

Lue lisää

Olet varmaan niitä miehiä joita tarvitaan silloin kun autoon tulee vika eikä käsillä ole muuta kuin yksi ruuvimeisseli ja pätkä rautalankaa.

aito-arska kirjoitti:

Teollisuuslaitoksia Saksassa ei tosin pommitettu "aivan sodan alusta lähtien". Ensimmäiset RAF:n pommitukset Saksaan muistaakseni tapahtuivat vuoden -40 syksyllä. Silloin osoituksena saksalaisille asenteella "will newer surrender" kuin päämääränä tuhota sotatarviketeollisuus. Strategiset pommitukset "bomber-Harrisin" komennossa alkoivat talvella 42-43. Raskain RAF:n tappioin.

Lue lisää

Yksi sodan kannalta merkittävä tapahtuma oli, että Brittikoneet iskivät Battle of Britainin aikana tuhannen Lancaster koneen voimin Berliiniin ja Hitler menetti hermonsa ja käski Messerschmittien hyökätä Lontoon kaduille ja niin edelleen. Kaikkea sellaista strategisesti luonnon vastaista ja niinhän siinä kävi, että kun Hitlerin hermot petti, niin Operatzion See Löwe jäi väliin ja hermonmenetys kostautui Normandiassa 6.6.1944.

vodjakki kirjoitti:

Yksi sodan kannalta merkittävä tapahtuma oli, että Brittikoneet iskivät Battle of Britainin aikana tuhannen Lancaster koneen voimin Berliiniin ja Hitler menetti hermonsa ja käski Messerschmittien hyökätä Lontoon kaduille ja niin edelleen. Kaikkea sellaista strategisesti luonnon vastaista ja niinhän siinä kävi, että kun Hitlerin hermot petti, niin Operatzion See Löwe jäi väliin ja hermonmenetys kostautui Normandiassa 6.6.1944.

Lue lisää

Menetin juuri mielenkiintoni vastailla tämän enempää kirjoituksiisi. Huomasin historian tietämyksesi tason. Että ihan tuhat Lancaster-konetta Berliinissä battle of Britainin aikaan.

I rest my case

aito-arska kirjoitti:

Menetin juuri mielenkiintoni vastailla tämän enempää kirjoituksiisi. Huomasin historian tietämyksesi tason. Että ihan tuhat Lancaster-konetta Berliinissä battle of Britainin aikaan.

I rest my case

Lue lisää

Jos yritit ärsyttää, niin meni vähän ohi, sillä pommitus oli virallisten tietojen mukaan totta. Jos keksit jotain todisteita vastaan, niin antaa tulla.
Mieluummin esität tarkan konemäärän tästä hyökkäyksestä, sillä luin sen tietosanakirjasta, enkä sen kummemmasta lähteestä. (ei siis kovin tarkka lähde) Yritän selvittää itse tarkemmin.

vodjakki kirjoitti:

Jos yritit ärsyttää, niin meni vähän ohi, sillä pommitus oli virallisten tietojen mukaan totta. Jos keksit jotain todisteita vastaan, niin antaa tulla.
Mieluummin esität tarkan konemäärän tästä hyökkäyksestä, sillä luin sen tietosanakirjasta, enkä sen kummemmasta lähteestä. (ei siis kovin tarkka lähde) Yritän selvittää itse tarkemmin.

Lue lisää

Sinä väität, että tuhat Lancaster-pommikonetta (otettu käyttöön 6/40) on kesä-syyskuun aikana v-40 jolloin battle of britain käytiin, hyökkäämässä Berliiniin.Vaadit todisteita ettei niin olisi tapahtunut.

"Jos keksit jotain todisteita vastaan, niin antaa tulla.
Mieluummin esität tarkan konemäärän tästä hyökkäyksestä, sillä luin sen tietosanakirjasta, enkä sen kummemmasta lähteestä. (ei siis kovin tarkka lähde) Yritän selvittää itse tarkemmin."

Eiköhän se ole sinä jonka pitää todistaa tuonkaltainen bullshit jota yrität esittää. Miksi valehtelet?

Duoda Vodjakki kirjoitti:

Sinä väität, että tuhat Lancaster-pommikonetta (otettu käyttöön 6/40) on kesä-syyskuun aikana v-40 jolloin battle of britain käytiin, hyökkäämässä Berliiniin.Vaadit todisteita ettei niin olisi tapahtunut.

"Jos keksit jotain todisteita vastaan, niin antaa tulla.
Mieluummin esität tarkan konemäärän tästä hyökkäyksestä, sillä luin sen tietosanakirjasta, enkä sen kummemmasta lähteestä. (ei siis kovin tarkka lähde) Yritän selvittää itse tarkemmin."

Eiköhän se ole sinä jonka pitää todistaa tuonkaltainen bullshit jota yrität esittää. Miksi valehtelet?

Lue lisää

Miten voin valehdella, kun lainasin suoraan kirjasta?
Google ei löytänyt tarkkaa konemäärää 25/8/1940 tehdystä Berliiniin kohdistetusta pommituksesta, mutta uskoisin määrän olleen todella korkea, kun lähteeni puhui tuhannen koneen hyökkäyksestä.
Mainitsit koneen käyttöönottoajan joten luulen, että määrä oli liioiteltu ja konemäärä olikin ehkä parisataa. Se kuitenkin oli merkittävä sodan kululle, siis se hyökkäys.

Article from World War II Magazine

http://historynet.com/wwii/blkursk/



Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory



New evidence suggests that the Germans may have been closer to victory

at Kursk than previously recognized.
By George M. Nipe, Jr.



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Following their disastrous defeat at Stalingrad during the winter of

1942-43, the German armed forces launched a climactic offensive in the

East known as Operation Citadel on July 4,1943. The climax of Operation

Citadel, the Battle of Kursk, involved as many as 6,000 tanks, 4,000

aircraft and 2 million fighting men and is remembered as the greatest

tank battle in history. The high-water mark of the battle was the

massive armor engagement at Prochorovka (also spelled Prokhorovka),

which began on July 12. But while historians have categorized

Prochorovka as a victory of improved Soviet tactics over German

firepower and heavy tanks, new evidence casts the struggle at the

"gully of death" in a very different light.

The Germans' goal during Citadel was to pinch off a large salient in

the Eastern Front that extended 70 miles toward the west. Field Marshal

Günther von Kluge's Army Group Center would attack from the north flank

of the bulge, with Colonel General Walther Model's Ninth Army leading

the effort, General Hans Zorn's XLVI Panzer Corps on the right flank

and Maj. Gen. Josef Harpe's XLI Panzer Corps on the left. General

Joachim Lemelsen's XLVII Panzer Corps planned to drive toward Kursk and

meet up with Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South, Col.

Gen. Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and the Kempf Army, commanded by

General Werner Kempf.

Opposing the German forces were the Soviet Central Front, led by

General Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, and the Voronezh Front, led by

General Nikolai F. Vatutin. The Central Front, with the right wing

strengthened by Lt. Gen. Nikolai P. Pukhov's Thirteenth Army and Lt.

Gen. I.V. Galinin's Seventeenth Army, was to defend the northern

sector. To the south, the Voronezh Front faced the German Army Group

South with three armies and two in reserve. The Sixth Guards Army, led

by Lt. Gen. Mikhail N. Chistyakov, and the Seventh Guards Army, led by

Lt. Gen. M. S. Shumilov, held the center and left wing. East of Kursk,

Col. Gen. Ivan S. Konev's Steppe Military District (renamed Steppe

Front on July 10, 1943) was to hold German breakthroughs, then mount

the counteroffensive.

If their plan succeeded, the Germans would encircle and destroy more

than five Soviet armies. Such a victory would have forced the Soviets

to delay their operations and might have allowed the Wehrmacht

desperately needed breathing room on the Eastern Front. Model's Ninth

Army never came close to breaking the Soviet defenses in the north,

however, and soon became deadlocked in a war of attrition that it could

not win. On the southern flank, Kempf's III Panzer Corps, commanded by

GeneralHermann Breith, also encountered tough Soviet resistance. By

July 11, however, Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army was in position to capture

the town of Prochorovka, secure a bridgehead over the Psel River and

advance on Oboyan. The Psel was the last natural barrier between

Manstein's panzers and Kursk. The Fourth Panzer Army's attack on the

town was led by SS General Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps,

GeneralOtto von Knobelsdorff's XLVIII Panzer Corps and General Ott's

LII Army Corps. Hausser's corps was made up of three panzer

divisions--the 1st LeibstandarteAdolf Hitler (Adolf Hitler's

bodyguard), 2nd SS Das Reich (The Empire) and 3rd SS Totenkopf (Death's

Head). Although all three were technically Panzergrenadier divisions,

each had more than 100 tanks when Citadel began. Knobelsdorff's corps

was composed of the 167th and 332nd infantry divisions, the 3rd and

11th panzer divisions, Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland and

Panther Brigade Decker, and Ott's corps contained the 25th and 57th

infantry divisions.

Opposing Hausser at Prochorovka was the newly arrived and reinforced

Fifth Guards Tank Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Pavel A. Rotmistrov. The

Fifth Guards was the Soviet strategic armored reserve in the south, the

last significant uncommitted armored formation in the sector, with more

than 650 tanks. The Soviet operational armored reserve, General Mikhail

E. Katukov's First Tank Army, was already in action against Hoth's

Fourth Panzer Army south of the Psel. Katukov's army had been unable to

prevent the Germans from reaching the river, however. His VI Tank

Corps, originally equipped with more than 200 tanks, had only 50 left

by July 10 and 11, and the other two corps of Katukov's army also had

sustained serious losses. On July 10, the 3rd SS Division Totenkopf,

commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Hermann Priess, had established a bridgehead

over the Psel, west of Prochorovka. By July 11, the division's panzer

group had crossed the river on pontoon bridges and reached the

bridgehead. What was left of Katukov's armor regrouped to oppose the

XLVIII Panzer Corps below Oboyan or counterattack the Psel bridgehead.

Reinforced with the XXXIII Rifle Corps and X Tank Corps, Katukov

launched continuous attacks on the Totenkopf units on the north bank of

the river.

During the evening of July 11, Hausser readied his divisions for an

assault on Prochorovka. Totenkopf anchored the left flank of the corps,

while Leibstandarte, commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Theodore Wisch, was in

the center, assembled west of the town between a rail line and the

Psel. Das Reich, commanded by SS Lt. Gen. Walter Krüger, moved into its

attack zone on the corps' right flank, which was several kilometers

south of Tetrevino and southwest of Prochorovka.

While Hausser's SS divisions prepared for battle, there was feverish

activity in the Soviet camp as well. On July 11, the Fifth Guards Tank

Army arrived in the Prochorovka area, having begun its march on July 7

from assembly areas nearly 200 miles to the east. The army consisted of

the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps and the V Guards Mechanized Corps.

Rotmistrov's 650 tanks were reinforced by the II Tank Corps and II

Guards Tank Corps, increasing its strength to about 850 tanks, 500 of

which were T-34s. The Fifth Guards' primary mission was to lead the

main post-Kursk counteroffensive, known as Operation Rumyantsev, and

its secondary mission was as defensive insurance in the south. The

commitment of Rotmistrov's army at such an early date is stark evidence

of Soviet concern about the situation on the Psel. The Fifth Guards'

arrival at the Psel set the stage for the Battle of Prochorovka.

Prochorovka is one of the best-known of the many battles on the Eastern

Front during World War II. It has been covered in articles, books and

televised historical documentaries, but these accounts vary in

accuracy; some are merely incomplete, while others border on fiction.

In the generally accepted version of the battle, the three SS divisions

attacked Prochorovka shoulder to shoulder, jammed into the terrain

between the Psel and the railroad. A total of 500 to 700 German tanks,

including dozens of Panzerkampfwagen Mark V Panther medium tanks with

75mm guns and Panzerkampfwagen Mark VI Tiger heavy tanks with deadly

88mm cannons, lumbered forward while hundreds of nimble Soviet T-34

medium tanks raced into the midst of the SS armor and threw the Germans

into confusion. The Soviets closed with the panzers, negating the

Tigers' 88mm guns, outmaneuvered the German armor and knocked out

hundreds of German tanks. The Soviet tank force's audacious tactics

resulted in a disastrous defeat for the Germans, and the disorganized

SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including

between 70 and 100 Tigers and many Panthers. Those losses smashed the

SS divisions' fighting power, and as a result Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army

had no chance to achieve even a partial victory in the south.

While it makes a dramatic story, nearly all of this battle scenario is

essentially myth. Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and

combat records of II SS Panzer Corps--available on microfilm at the

National Archives in Washington, D.C.--provides information that forces

a historical reappraisal of the battle. These records show, first of

all, that Hausser's corps began with far fewer tanks than previously

believed and, more important, that they suffered only moderate losses

on July 12, 1943. As those reports were intended to allow the corps

commander to assess the combat strength of his divisions, they can be

considered reasonably accurate. Considering that information, it seems

that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern

flank of the salient.






Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory

The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been

variously reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others

have estimated between 300 to 600. Even before the Battle of Kursk

began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 500 tanks, much less

700. On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched,

Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them,

plus a number of command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had

a total of 211 operational tanks--Totenkopf had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte

had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. Damaged tanks or tanks

undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still in

action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The

battalions that were equipped with Panthers were still training in

Germany in July 1943.

On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army

reports declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks,

a net loss of only 48 tanks. Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the

discrepancy due to the gain of repaired tanks returned to action.

Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the corps

lost about 70 tanks on July 12. In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long

assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history

of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed

that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave

no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage.

Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks

lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to

mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the

Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength

of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those

losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin. Subsequently, the

depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and

Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry

positions west of the town.

Another misconception about the battle is the image of all three SS

divisions attacking shoulder to shoulder through the narrow lane

between the Psel and the rail line west of Prochorovka. Only

Leibstandarte was aligned directly west of the town, and it was the

only division to attack the town itself. The II SS Panzer Corps zone of

battle, contrary to the impression given in many accounts, was

approximately nine miles wide, with Totenkopf on the left flank,

Leibstandarte in the center and Das Reich on the right flank.

Totenkopf's armor was committed primarily to the Psel bridgehead and in

defensive action against Soviet attacks on the Psel bridges. In fact,

only Leibstandarte actually advanced into the corridor west of

Prochorovka, and then only after it had thrown back initial Soviet

attacks.

Early on July 12, Leibstandarte units reported a great deal of loud

motor noise, which indicated massing Soviet armor. Soon after 5 a.m.,

hundreds of Soviet tanks, carrying infantry, rolled out of Prochorovka

and its environs in groups of 40 to 50. Waves of T-34 and T-70 tanks

advanced at high speed in a charge straight at the startled Germans.

When machine-gun fire, armor-piercing shells and artillery fire struck

the T-34s, the Soviet infantry jumped off and sought cover. Leaving

their infantry behind, the T-34s rolled on. Those Soviet tanks that

survived the initial clash with SS armor continued a linear advance and

were destroyed by the Germans.

When the initial Soviet attack paused, Leibstandarte pushed its armor

toward the town and collided with elements of Rotmistrov's reserve

armor. A Soviet attack by the 181st Tank Regiment was defeated by

several SS Tigers, one of which, the 13th (heavy) Company of the 1st SS

Panzer Regiment, was commanded by 2nd Lt. Michael Wittmann, the most

successful tank commander of the war. Wittmann's group was advancing in

flank support of the German main attack when it was engaged by the

Soviet tank regiment at long range. The Soviet charge, straight at the

Tigers over open ground, was suicidal. The frontal armor of the Tiger

was impervious to the 76mm guns of the T-34s at any great distance. The

field was soon littered with burning T-34s and T-70s. None of the

Tigers were lost, but the 181st Tank Regiment was annihilated. Late in

the day, Rotmistrov committed his last reserves, elements of the V

Mechanized Corps, which finally halted Leibstandarte.

Das Reich began its attack from several kilometers southwest of

Prochorovka and was quickly engaged by aggressive battle groups of the

II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps. Fierce, somewhat confused

fighting broke out all along the German division's axis of advance.

Battle groups of 20 to 40 Soviet tanks, supported by infantry and

ground-attack planes, collided with Das Reich regimental spearheads.

Rotmistrov continued to throw armor against the division, and combat

raged throughout the day, with heavy losses of Soviet armor. Das Reich

continued to push slowly eastward, advancing into the night while

suffering relatively light tank losses.






Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory

Meanwhile, on the left flank, Soviet First Tank Army elements

unsuccessfully tried to crush Totenkopf's bridgehead. The SS division

fought off the XXXI and X Tank Corps, supported by elements of the

XXXIII Rifle Corps. In spite of the Soviet attacks, Totenkopf's panzer

group drove toward a road that ran from the village of Kartaschevka,

southeast across the river and into Prochorovka.

The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor,

continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either

side--contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the

Eastern Front, which state that the fighting ended on July 12 with a

decisive German defeat. These authors describe the battlefield as

littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks and report that the

Soviets overran the SS tank repair units. In fact, the fighting

continued around Prochorovka for several more days. Das Reich continued

to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16.

That advance enabled the III Panzer Corps to link up with the SS

division on July 14 and encircle several Soviet rifle divisions south

of Prochorovka. Totenkopf eventually reached the

Kartaschevka­Prochorovka road, and the division took several tactically

important hills on the north edge of its perimeter as well. Those

successes were not exploited, however, due to decisions made by Adolf

Hitler.

After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as

reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum,

Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he

should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had

unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of

XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could

have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to

break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of

Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was

committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the

Soviet defenses. Manstein correctly realized that he had the

opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in

the Prochorovka area.

Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead,

he dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the

anticipated Soviet diversionary attacks south of the Belgorod­Kharkov

sector. On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its

positions around Prochorovka. Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended,

not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational

tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the

offensive. The SS panzer divisions were still full of fight; in fact,

two of them continued to fight effectively in southern Russia for the

rest of the summer.

Leibstandarte was ordered to Italy, but Das Reich and Totenkopf

remained in the East. Those two divisions and the 3rd Panzer Division,

which replaced Leibstandarte, were transferred to the Sixth Army area,

where they conducted a counterattack from July 31 to August 2 that

eliminated a strong Soviet bridgehead at the Mius River. Without pause,

the three divisions were then transferred to the Bogodukhov sector in

early August 1943. Under the command of the III Panzer Corps, they were

joined by another unit, the Fifth SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking.

During three weeks of constant combat, the four divisions played a

major role in stopping the main Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive,

Operation Rumyantsev. They fought Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army,

rebuilt to 503 tanks strong, and major portions of the First Tank Army,

now at 542 tanks.








Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory

By the end of the month, Rotmistrov had less than 100 tanks still

running. Katukov had only 120 tanks still in action by the last week of

August. While at no time did any of the German divisions have more than

55 tanks in operation, they repeatedly blunted the thrusts of the two

Soviet tank armies, which were also reinforced by several rifle corps.

Totenkopf repeatedly cut off and defeated all of the First Tank Army's

thrusts toward the Kharkov­Poltava rail line. Das Reich threw back two

Soviet tank corps south of Bogodukhov and blunted Rotmistrov's last

major attack west of Kharkov, and the III Panzer Corps halted Operation

Rumyantsev.

After Kharkov itself fell, however, the German front gradually

collapsed. The Soviets regrouped, committed additional strong reserves

and renewed their attack toward the strategically important Dnepr

River. Army Group South was subsequently forced to abandon much of

southern Ukraine in a race for the safety of the Dnepr. Despite the

remarkable efforts of the German army and Waffen SS panzer divisions

during July and August, the Germans were too weak to hold the

Kharkov­Belgorod­Poltava sector after their summer losses.

It is apparent from their operations during the late summer that the SS

panzer divisions were not destroyed at Prochorovka. This reassessment

of the battle provides food for thought regarding possible German

successes if Manstein's panzer reserves had been utilized as he had

intended.

To what extent the course of events in Russia would have been changed

is, of course, unknown, but it is interesting to speculate. If Army

Group South's panzer reserve had been used to encircle and destroy the

Fifth Guards Tank Army and the First Tank Army, the outcome of the war

in Russia might have been significantly different. Although it was

beyond the German army's capabilities to force a military end to the

war by the summer of 1943, a limited victory in the south could have

resulted in a delay of Soviet strategic operations for months or

perhaps longer. It is doubtful, however, that this pause would have

lasted long enough for the Germans to transfer enough forces to the

West to defeat the June 6, 1944, D-Day invasion.

But one fact is beyond any question, regardless of the number of tanks

possessed by the Germans or Soviets or what might have been possible.

Due to Hausser's panzer corps' failure to take Prochorovka on July 12

and the subsequent misuse of German panzer reserves, the momentum of

the Fourth Panzer Army was slowed dramatically. When Hitler abandoned

Operation Citadel on July 13, the Germans' last opportunity to

influence events on a strategic level in the East was lost.

It is interesting that the information regarding German tank losses at

Prochorovka has not been made available before now. Due to the lack of

crucial primary-source information--especially the records of the II SS

Panzer Corps on the Eastern Front--there had been no evidence to

correct the erroneous accounts and impressions given in previous

studies of the Eastern Front.

Waffen SS formations' records of their Eastern Front operations were

not declassified until 1978­1981. By that time, many of the major works

about the Eastern Front had already been published. Later authors

accepted the accounts of the battle as given in the earlier books and

failed to conduct additional research. As a result, one of the best

known of all Eastern Front battles has never been understood properly.

Prochorovka was believed to have been a significant German defeat but

was actually a stunning reversal for the Soviets because they suffered

enormous tank losses.

As Manstein suggested, Prochorovka may truly have been a lost German

victory, thanks to decisions made by Hitler. It was fortunate for the

Allied cause that the German dictator, a foremost proponent of the

value of will, lost his own will to fight in southern Ukraine in July

1943. Had he allowed Manstein to continue the attack on the two Soviet

tank armies in the Prochorovka area, Manstein might have achieved a

victory even more damaging to the Soviets than the counterattack that

had recaptured Kharkov in March 1943.








This article was written by George M. Nipe, Jr. and originally appeared

in the February 1998 issue of World War II magazine.

For more great articles subscribe to World War II magazine today!

Sälääjä kirjoitti:

Article from World War II Magazine

http://historynet.com/wwii/blkursk/



Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory



New evidence suggests that the Germans may have been closer to victory

at Kursk than previously recognized.
By George M. Nipe, Jr.



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Following their disastrous defeat at Stalingrad during the winter of

1942-43, the German armed forces launched a climactic offensive in the

East known as Operation Citadel on July 4,1943. The climax of Operation

Citadel, the Battle of Kursk, involved as many as 6,000 tanks, 4,000

aircraft and 2 million fighting men and is remembered as the greatest

tank battle in history. The high-water mark of the battle was the

massive armor engagement at Prochorovka (also spelled Prokhorovka),

which began on July 12. But while historians have categorized

Prochorovka as a victory of improved Soviet tactics over German

firepower and heavy tanks, new evidence casts the struggle at the

"gully of death" in a very different light.

The Germans' goal during Citadel was to pinch off a large salient in

the Eastern Front that extended 70 miles toward the west. Field Marshal

Günther von Kluge's Army Group Center would attack from the north flank

of the bulge, with Colonel General Walther Model's Ninth Army leading

the effort, General Hans Zorn's XLVI Panzer Corps on the right flank

and Maj. Gen. Josef Harpe's XLI Panzer Corps on the left. General

Joachim Lemelsen's XLVII Panzer Corps planned to drive toward Kursk and

meet up with Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South, Col.

Gen. Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and the Kempf Army, commanded by

General Werner Kempf.

Opposing the German forces were the Soviet Central Front, led by

General Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, and the Voronezh Front, led by

General Nikolai F. Vatutin. The Central Front, with the right wing

strengthened by Lt. Gen. Nikolai P. Pukhov's Thirteenth Army and Lt.

Gen. I.V. Galinin's Seventeenth Army, was to defend the northern

sector. To the south, the Voronezh Front faced the German Army Group

South with three armies and two in reserve. The Sixth Guards Army, led

by Lt. Gen. Mikhail N. Chistyakov, and the Seventh Guards Army, led by

Lt. Gen. M. S. Shumilov, held the center and left wing. East of Kursk,

Col. Gen. Ivan S. Konev's Steppe Military District (renamed Steppe

Front on July 10, 1943) was to hold German breakthroughs, then mount

the counteroffensive.

If their plan succeeded, the Germans would encircle and destroy more

than five Soviet armies. Such a victory would have forced the Soviets

to delay their operations and might have allowed the Wehrmacht

desperately needed breathing room on the Eastern Front. Model's Ninth

Army never came close to breaking the Soviet defenses in the north,

however, and soon became deadlocked in a war of attrition that it could

not win. On the southern flank, Kempf's III Panzer Corps, commanded by

GeneralHermann Breith, also encountered tough Soviet resistance. By

July 11, however, Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army was in position to capture

the town of Prochorovka, secure a bridgehead over the Psel River and

advance on Oboyan. The Psel was the last natural barrier between

Manstein's panzers and Kursk. The Fourth Panzer Army's attack on the

town was led by SS General Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps,

GeneralOtto von Knobelsdorff's XLVIII Panzer Corps and General Ott's

LII Army Corps. Hausser's corps was made up of three panzer

divisions--the 1st LeibstandarteAdolf Hitler (Adolf Hitler's

bodyguard), 2nd SS Das Reich (The Empire) and 3rd SS Totenkopf (Death's

Head). Although all three were technically Panzergrenadier divisions,

each had more than 100 tanks when Citadel began. Knobelsdorff's corps

was composed of the 167th and 332nd infantry divisions, the 3rd and

11th panzer divisions, Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland and

Panther Brigade Decker, and Ott's corps contained the 25th and 57th

infantry divisions.

Opposing Hausser at Prochorovka was the newly arrived and reinforced

Fifth Guards Tank Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Pavel A. Rotmistrov. The

Fifth Guards was the Soviet strategic armored reserve in the south, the

last significant uncommitted armored formation in the sector, with more

than 650 tanks. The Soviet operational armored reserve, General Mikhail

E. Katukov's First Tank Army, was already in action against Hoth's

Fourth Panzer Army south of the Psel. Katukov's army had been unable to

prevent the Germans from reaching the river, however. His VI Tank

Corps, originally equipped with more than 200 tanks, had only 50 left

by July 10 and 11, and the other two corps of Katukov's army also had

sustained serious losses. On July 10, the 3rd SS Division Totenkopf,

commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Hermann Priess, had established a bridgehead

over the Psel, west of Prochorovka. By July 11, the division's panzer

group had crossed the river on pontoon bridges and reached the

bridgehead. What was left of Katukov's armor regrouped to oppose the

XLVIII Panzer Corps below Oboyan or counterattack the Psel bridgehead.

Reinforced with the XXXIII Rifle Corps and X Tank Corps, Katukov

launched continuous attacks on the Totenkopf units on the north bank of

the river.

During the evening of July 11, Hausser readied his divisions for an

assault on Prochorovka. Totenkopf anchored the left flank of the corps,

while Leibstandarte, commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Theodore Wisch, was in

the center, assembled west of the town between a rail line and the

Psel. Das Reich, commanded by SS Lt. Gen. Walter Krüger, moved into its

attack zone on the corps' right flank, which was several kilometers

south of Tetrevino and southwest of Prochorovka.

While Hausser's SS divisions prepared for battle, there was feverish

activity in the Soviet camp as well. On July 11, the Fifth Guards Tank

Army arrived in the Prochorovka area, having begun its march on July 7

from assembly areas nearly 200 miles to the east. The army consisted of

the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps and the V Guards Mechanized Corps.

Rotmistrov's 650 tanks were reinforced by the II Tank Corps and II

Guards Tank Corps, increasing its strength to about 850 tanks, 500 of

which were T-34s. The Fifth Guards' primary mission was to lead the

main post-Kursk counteroffensive, known as Operation Rumyantsev, and

its secondary mission was as defensive insurance in the south. The

commitment of Rotmistrov's army at such an early date is stark evidence

of Soviet concern about the situation on the Psel. The Fifth Guards'

arrival at the Psel set the stage for the Battle of Prochorovka.

Prochorovka is one of the best-known of the many battles on the Eastern

Front during World War II. It has been covered in articles, books and

televised historical documentaries, but these accounts vary in

accuracy; some are merely incomplete, while others border on fiction.

In the generally accepted version of the battle, the three SS divisions

attacked Prochorovka shoulder to shoulder, jammed into the terrain

between the Psel and the railroad. A total of 500 to 700 German tanks,

including dozens of Panzerkampfwagen Mark V Panther medium tanks with

75mm guns and Panzerkampfwagen Mark VI Tiger heavy tanks with deadly

88mm cannons, lumbered forward while hundreds of nimble Soviet T-34

medium tanks raced into the midst of the SS armor and threw the Germans

into confusion. The Soviets closed with the panzers, negating the

Tigers' 88mm guns, outmaneuvered the German armor and knocked out

hundreds of German tanks. The Soviet tank force's audacious tactics

resulted in a disastrous defeat for the Germans, and the disorganized

SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including

between 70 and 100 Tigers and many Panthers. Those losses smashed the

SS divisions' fighting power, and as a result Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army

had no chance to achieve even a partial victory in the south.

While it makes a dramatic story, nearly all of this battle scenario is

essentially myth. Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and

combat records of II SS Panzer Corps--available on microfilm at the

National Archives in Washington, D.C.--provides information that forces

a historical reappraisal of the battle. These records show, first of

all, that Hausser's corps began with far fewer tanks than previously

believed and, more important, that they suffered only moderate losses

on July 12, 1943. As those reports were intended to allow the corps

commander to assess the combat strength of his divisions, they can be

considered reasonably accurate. Considering that information, it seems

that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern

flank of the salient.






Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory

The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been

variously reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others

have estimated between 300 to 600. Even before the Battle of Kursk

began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 500 tanks, much less

700. On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched,

Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them,

plus a number of command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had

a total of 211 operational tanks--Totenkopf had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte

had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. Damaged tanks or tanks

undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still in

action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The

battalions that were equipped with Panthers were still training in

Germany in July 1943.

On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army

reports declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks,

a net loss of only 48 tanks. Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the

discrepancy due to the gain of repaired tanks returned to action.

Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the corps

lost about 70 tanks on July 12. In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long

assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history

of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed

that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave

no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage.

Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks

lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to

mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the

Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength

of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those

losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin. Subsequently, the

depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and

Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry

positions west of the town.

Another misconception about the battle is the image of all three SS

divisions attacking shoulder to shoulder through the narrow lane

between the Psel and the rail line west of Prochorovka. Only

Leibstandarte was aligned directly west of the town, and it was the

only division to attack the town itself. The II SS Panzer Corps zone of

battle, contrary to the impression given in many accounts, was

approximately nine miles wide, with Totenkopf on the left flank,

Leibstandarte in the center and Das Reich on the right flank.

Totenkopf's armor was committed primarily to the Psel bridgehead and in

defensive action against Soviet attacks on the Psel bridges. In fact,

only Leibstandarte actually advanced into the corridor west of

Prochorovka, and then only after it had thrown back initial Soviet

attacks.

Early on July 12, Leibstandarte units reported a great deal of loud

motor noise, which indicated massing Soviet armor. Soon after 5 a.m.,

hundreds of Soviet tanks, carrying infantry, rolled out of Prochorovka

and its environs in groups of 40 to 50. Waves of T-34 and T-70 tanks

advanced at high speed in a charge straight at the startled Germans.

When machine-gun fire, armor-piercing shells and artillery fire struck

the T-34s, the Soviet infantry jumped off and sought cover. Leaving

their infantry behind, the T-34s rolled on. Those Soviet tanks that

survived the initial clash with SS armor continued a linear advance and

were destroyed by the Germans.

When the initial Soviet attack paused, Leibstandarte pushed its armor

toward the town and collided with elements of Rotmistrov's reserve

armor. A Soviet attack by the 181st Tank Regiment was defeated by

several SS Tigers, one of which, the 13th (heavy) Company of the 1st SS

Panzer Regiment, was commanded by 2nd Lt. Michael Wittmann, the most

successful tank commander of the war. Wittmann's group was advancing in

flank support of the German main attack when it was engaged by the

Soviet tank regiment at long range. The Soviet charge, straight at the

Tigers over open ground, was suicidal. The frontal armor of the Tiger

was impervious to the 76mm guns of the T-34s at any great distance. The

field was soon littered with burning T-34s and T-70s. None of the

Tigers were lost, but the 181st Tank Regiment was annihilated. Late in

the day, Rotmistrov committed his last reserves, elements of the V

Mechanized Corps, which finally halted Leibstandarte.

Das Reich began its attack from several kilometers southwest of

Prochorovka and was quickly engaged by aggressive battle groups of the

II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps. Fierce, somewhat confused

fighting broke out all along the German division's axis of advance.

Battle groups of 20 to 40 Soviet tanks, supported by infantry and

ground-attack planes, collided with Das Reich regimental spearheads.

Rotmistrov continued to throw armor against the division, and combat

raged throughout the day, with heavy losses of Soviet armor. Das Reich

continued to push slowly eastward, advancing into the night while

suffering relatively light tank losses.






Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory

Meanwhile, on the left flank, Soviet First Tank Army elements

unsuccessfully tried to crush Totenkopf's bridgehead. The SS division

fought off the XXXI and X Tank Corps, supported by elements of the

XXXIII Rifle Corps. In spite of the Soviet attacks, Totenkopf's panzer

group drove toward a road that ran from the village of Kartaschevka,

southeast across the river and into Prochorovka.

The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor,

continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either

side--contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the

Eastern Front, which state that the fighting ended on July 12 with a

decisive German defeat. These authors describe the battlefield as

littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks and report that the

Soviets overran the SS tank repair units. In fact, the fighting

continued around Prochorovka for several more days. Das Reich continued

to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16.

That advance enabled the III Panzer Corps to link up with the SS

division on July 14 and encircle several Soviet rifle divisions south

of Prochorovka. Totenkopf eventually reached the

Kartaschevka­Prochorovka road, and the division took several tactically

important hills on the north edge of its perimeter as well. Those

successes were not exploited, however, due to decisions made by Adolf

Hitler.

After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as

reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum,

Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he

should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had

unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of

XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could

have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to

break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of

Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was

committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the

Soviet defenses. Manstein correctly realized that he had the

opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in

the Prochorovka area.

Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead,

he dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the

anticipated Soviet diversionary attacks south of the Belgorod­Kharkov

sector. On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its

positions around Prochorovka. Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended,

not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational

tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the

offensive. The SS panzer divisions were still full of fight; in fact,

two of them continued to fight effectively in southern Russia for the

rest of the summer.

Leibstandarte was ordered to Italy, but Das Reich and Totenkopf

remained in the East. Those two divisions and the 3rd Panzer Division,

which replaced Leibstandarte, were transferred to the Sixth Army area,

where they conducted a counterattack from July 31 to August 2 that

eliminated a strong Soviet bridgehead at the Mius River. Without pause,

the three divisions were then transferred to the Bogodukhov sector in

early August 1943. Under the command of the III Panzer Corps, they were

joined by another unit, the Fifth SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking.

During three weeks of constant combat, the four divisions played a

major role in stopping the main Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive,

Operation Rumyantsev. They fought Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army,

rebuilt to 503 tanks strong, and major portions of the First Tank Army,

now at 542 tanks.








Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory

By the end of the month, Rotmistrov had less than 100 tanks still

running. Katukov had only 120 tanks still in action by the last week of

August. While at no time did any of the German divisions have more than

55 tanks in operation, they repeatedly blunted the thrusts of the two

Soviet tank armies, which were also reinforced by several rifle corps.

Totenkopf repeatedly cut off and defeated all of the First Tank Army's

thrusts toward the Kharkov­Poltava rail line. Das Reich threw back two

Soviet tank corps south of Bogodukhov and blunted Rotmistrov's last

major attack west of Kharkov, and the III Panzer Corps halted Operation

Rumyantsev.

After Kharkov itself fell, however, the German front gradually

collapsed. The Soviets regrouped, committed additional strong reserves

and renewed their attack toward the strategically important Dnepr

River. Army Group South was subsequently forced to abandon much of

southern Ukraine in a race for the safety of the Dnepr. Despite the

remarkable efforts of the German army and Waffen SS panzer divisions

during July and August, the Germans were too weak to hold the

Kharkov­Belgorod­Poltava sector after their summer losses.

It is apparent from their operations during the late summer that the SS

panzer divisions were not destroyed at Prochorovka. This reassessment

of the battle provides food for thought regarding possible German

successes if Manstein's panzer reserves had been utilized as he had

intended.

To what extent the course of events in Russia would have been changed

is, of course, unknown, but it is interesting to speculate. If Army

Group South's panzer reserve had been used to encircle and destroy the

Fifth Guards Tank Army and the First Tank Army, the outcome of the war

in Russia might have been significantly different. Although it was

beyond the German army's capabilities to force a military end to the

war by the summer of 1943, a limited victory in the south could have

resulted in a delay of Soviet strategic operations for months or

perhaps longer. It is doubtful, however, that this pause would have

lasted long enough for the Germans to transfer enough forces to the

West to defeat the June 6, 1944, D-Day invasion.

But one fact is beyond any question, regardless of the number of tanks

possessed by the Germans or Soviets or what might have been possible.

Due to Hausser's panzer corps' failure to take Prochorovka on July 12

and the subsequent misuse of German panzer reserves, the momentum of

the Fourth Panzer Army was slowed dramatically. When Hitler abandoned

Operation Citadel on July 13, the Germans' last opportunity to

influence events on a strategic level in the East was lost.

It is interesting that the information regarding German tank losses at

Prochorovka has not been made available before now. Due to the lack of

crucial primary-source information--especially the records of the II SS

Panzer Corps on the Eastern Front--there had been no evidence to

correct the erroneous accounts and impressions given in previous

studies of the Eastern Front.

Waffen SS formations' records of their Eastern Front operations were

not declassified until 1978­1981. By that time, many of the major works

about the Eastern Front had already been published. Later authors

accepted the accounts of the battle as given in the earlier books and

failed to conduct additional research. As a result, one of the best

known of all Eastern Front battles has never been understood properly.

Prochorovka was believed to have been a significant German defeat but

was actually a stunning reversal for the Soviets because they suffered

enormous tank losses.

As Manstein suggested, Prochorovka may truly have been a lost German

victory, thanks to decisions made by Hitler. It was fortunate for the

Allied cause that the German dictator, a foremost proponent of the

value of will, lost his own will to fight in southern Ukraine in July

1943. Had he allowed Manstein to continue the attack on the two Soviet

tank armies in the Prochorovka area, Manstein might have achieved a

victory even more damaging to the Soviets than the counterattack that

had recaptured Kharkov in March 1943.








This article was written by George M. Nipe, Jr. and originally appeared

in the February 1998 issue of World War II magazine.

For more great articles subscribe to World War II magazine today!

Lue lisää

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk


Kurskin taistelu
: historian suurin panssaritaistelu


Tekijät
Frankson, Andres (Kirjailija)
Zetterling, Niklas (Kirjailija)

Kustantaja ja painovuosi
WSOY 2003

Tuotteen tiedot
Sidottu, 329 s.
sidottu, kovakantinen

Kieli
suomi

ISBN
9510283444

Kirjastoluokka
9035

Hinta
26,90
32,00


Saatavuus
Uusi painos mahdollinen
Rekisteröidy palveluun asettaaksesi tuotteita vahtipalveluun




Frankson-Zetterling: Kurskin taistelu.

TITAANIEN KOHTAAMINEN!


Tuhannet venäläiset ja saksalaiset panssarivaunut kohtasivat ennennäkemättömän laajassa voimainkoitoksessa kesällä 1943. Vaikka Neuvostoliiton mies- ja kalustotappiot olivat heinä- ja elokuun verisissä taisteluissa moninkertaiset vastustajaan verrattuna, Saksan kesäoffensiivi epäonnistui. Hitlerin sotajoukot eivät päässeet edes puoleenväliin tavoitettaan, Kurskin kaupunkia. Tappion myötä Saksa menetti itärintaman sotatapahtumien strategisen hallinnan, mistä syystä panssaritaistelua pidetään yhtenä toisen maailmansodan ratkaisevimmista käännekohdista.

Kurskin taistelu -teoksessa esitellään panssaritaistelun taktisen kulun ohella itärintaman sodankäyntiä laajemminkin. Kirja sisältää havainnollisia karttoja sotahistoriallisilta tapahtumapaikoilta, yksityiskohtaisia piirroksia molempien armeijakuntien tärkeimmistä panssarivaunutyypeistä sekä muun muassa kuvauksia tavallisten rintamasotilaiden tuntemuksista.

Maailman johtaviin sotahistorian asiantuntijoihin kuuluvat ruotsalaiset Anders Frankson ja Niklas Zetterling pääsivät vuonna 1995 tutkimaan Freiburgin saksalaisia sota-arkistoja. Vuosikausien tutkimustyönsä tuloksena he oikaisevat teoksessaan lukuisia, pelkästään venäläisiin dokumentteihin pohjautuneita virheellisiä käsityksiä kuuluisan panssaritaistelun vaiheista. Sidottu.