Suomelta ehdotonta antautumista.
Lainaus australialaisen Flindersin yliopiston webbisivulta
By September 1942 Germany had captured much of Stalingrad, yet by the end of November the Soviet Union ordered a massive counter-attack, surrounding Stalingrad and the occupying Germans and forcing them to surrender by February 1943 forcing Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, twenty-four generals and I 00,000 German soldiers to become prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. This coupled with other great military successes by the Allied forces dispelled the myth of German indomitability and, after a summit meeting in January 1943 with Roosevelt and Churchill, Roosevelt demanded unconditional surrender of the Axle states. To Finland it seemed that the Allies would make no distinction between Germany and her allies, so Finland had to make a separate peace quickly, but not if that peace meant sacrificing everything.
The Soviet Union did not appear to apply the principle of unconditional surrender to Finland, Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador, explained that while the Baltic States were considered to naturally belong to the Soviet Union, the Kremlin wanted to see Finland as 'a healthy, independent state' and that peace negotiations could be concluded on the basis of the situation that existed prior to the Winter War. This delighted the United States' leadership who immediately offered its services as mediator for peace negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union.
Koko sivu:
http://www.ssn.flinders.edu.au/scanlink/nornotes/vol4/articles/gnezda.html
Lainaus australialaisen Flindersin yliopiston webbisivulta
By September 1942 Germany had captured much of Stalingrad, yet by the end of November the Soviet Union ordered a massive counter-attack, surrounding Stalingrad and the occupying Germans and forcing them to surrender by February 1943 forcing Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, twenty-four generals and I 00,000 German soldiers to become prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. This coupled with other great military successes by the Allied forces dispelled the myth of German indomitability and, after a summit meeting in January 1943 with Roosevelt and Churchill, Roosevelt demanded unconditional surrender of the Axle states. To Finland it seemed that the Allies would make no distinction between Germany and her allies, so Finland had to make a separate peace quickly, but not if that peace meant sacrificing everything.
The Soviet Union did not appear to apply the principle of unconditional surrender to Finland, Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador, explained that while the Baltic States were considered to naturally belong to the Soviet Union, the Kremlin wanted to see Finland as 'a healthy, independent state' and that peace negotiations could be concluded on the basis of the situation that existed prior to the Winter War. This delighted the United States' leadership who immediately offered its services as mediator for peace negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union.
Koko sivu:
http://www.ssn.flinders.edu.au/scanlink/nornotes/vol4/articles/gnezda.html
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