Loppusaldoksi hän (Russel Harris) mainitsee: NL voitti molemmat sodat mutta ei Suomen tapauksessa koskaan kyennyt toteuttamaan "syvän taistelun"-strategian suurta päätavoitetta - Suomen valloittamista. Siis jenkkiupseeri toteaa sen saman minkä jo tiedämmekin: Suomi otti torjuntavoitot.
Executive Summary
Title: The Finnish Campaigns: Failure of Soviet Operational Art in World War II
Author: Major Russell Harris, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: Soviet operational art failures in the Finnish campaigns of World War II were a result of dogmatic interwar ideology that emphasized rigid adherence to doctrine rather than a flexibleapproach that should have been crafted to meet the unique circumstances of each conflict.
Discussion: The Soviet Union is well-known for its development of operations as the linkagebetween tactics and strategy, and its application as operational art. It is commonly recognized that Red Army’s development of deep battle during the interwar years and its refinement during World War II is an exceptional example of operational art and a testament to the genius of the Soviet Union’s military theorists. Soviet-style operational art grew from an ideological concept at a theoretical level, to a political controlled strategic doctrine, emerged as an offensive biased operational mindset, and, if Finland is overlooked, resulted in World War II deep battle success.
However, the Red Army’s execution and application of operational art is overstated when viewed through the lens of the 1939-40 Winter War and later in the Finnish theater of World War II. Despite 20 years of theoretical development and recent combat in Manchuria, the Soviets were badly bloodied by the Finns during the Winter War. Further, after four years of war experience fighting the Germans and having arguably ‘perfected’ deep battle, they never achieved any real depth in the 1944 summer offensive that forced Finland out of the war. The
Red Army achieved success in both campaigns against Finland through sound strategic planning, mass, and decisive tactical action. However, Finland’s systematic withdrawal to prepared secondary positions prevented the destruction of its army – the key Soviet operational objective.
Within five years the Soviet Union decisively defeated Finland in two wars, but failed to realize its doctrinal concept of deep battle and by its own definition operational art. Conclusion: A direct corollary can be drawn between Soviet tactical success and her realization of strategic ends without achieving operational goals in the Finnish campaigns. This experience questions the validity of the importance Soviet doctrine placed on operational art and highlights
the primacy of competent strategic planning.
Lähde:
The Finnish Campaigns: Failure of Soviet Operational Art in World War II
Tekijä: Harris, Russell D., Major, USMC
Executive Summary
Title: The Finnish Campaigns: Failure of Soviet Operational Art in World War II
Author: Major Russell Harris, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: Soviet operational art failures in the Finnish campaigns of World War II were a result of dogmatic interwar ideology that emphasized rigid adherence to doctrine rather than a flexibleapproach that should have been crafted to meet the unique circumstances of each conflict.
Discussion: The Soviet Union is well-known for its development of operations as the linkagebetween tactics and strategy, and its application as operational art. It is commonly recognized that Red Army’s development of deep battle during the interwar years and its refinement during World War II is an exceptional example of operational art and a testament to the genius of the Soviet Union’s military theorists. Soviet-style operational art grew from an ideological concept at a theoretical level, to a political controlled strategic doctrine, emerged as an offensive biased operational mindset, and, if Finland is overlooked, resulted in World War II deep battle success.
However, the Red Army’s execution and application of operational art is overstated when viewed through the lens of the 1939-40 Winter War and later in the Finnish theater of World War II. Despite 20 years of theoretical development and recent combat in Manchuria, the Soviets were badly bloodied by the Finns during the Winter War. Further, after four years of war experience fighting the Germans and having arguably ‘perfected’ deep battle, they never achieved any real depth in the 1944 summer offensive that forced Finland out of the war. The
Red Army achieved success in both campaigns against Finland through sound strategic planning, mass, and decisive tactical action. However, Finland’s systematic withdrawal to prepared secondary positions prevented the destruction of its army – the key Soviet operational objective.
Within five years the Soviet Union decisively defeated Finland in two wars, but failed to realize its doctrinal concept of deep battle and by its own definition operational art. Conclusion: A direct corollary can be drawn between Soviet tactical success and her realization of strategic ends without achieving operational goals in the Finnish campaigns. This experience questions the validity of the importance Soviet doctrine placed on operational art and highlights
the primacy of competent strategic planning.
Lähde:
The Finnish Campaigns: Failure of Soviet Operational Art in World War II
Tekijä: Harris, Russell D., Major, USMC
Vastaukset 8
Vanhimmat
Tällä linkillä löytyy PDF-tiedosto:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA602828&ei=Bid2VJTABIr4ywPDpIKYCQ&usg=AFQjCNEEsfaG-I4qU6ZGjEr1R6A6RgTd_w&sig2=yAChvbMDhOwSA77-gPS1Bg&bvm=bv.80642063,d.bGQ
"This experience questions the importance Soviet doctrine placed on operational art and highlights the primacy of competent strategic planning."
" Soviet operational art failures in the Finnish campaigns of World War II were a result of dogmatic interwar ideology that emphasized rigid adherence to doctrine rather than a flexible approach that should have been crafted to meet the unique circumstances of each conflict. "
Majuri Harrsin teesi näyttäisi viittaavan siihen että Neuvostoliitolla oli jäykkä ja typerä dogmaattinen tapa lähestyä Suomen asiaa. Sen voisi täsmentää jopa siten että NL teki jopa omille eduilleen hallaa tyrimällä asiat jo syksyllä 1939.
Maailmalla, jopa Venäjän sisällä aletaan jo käydä keskustelua siitä mitä osaa talvisodalla möhläily näytteli Operaatio Barbarossan toteutumisessa.
Suojeluskuntajärjestö, Lotta Svärd ja A.F. Airon luoma aluepuolustusjärjestelmä - liian kova pala neuvostoliittolaiselle luokkasodan doktriinille. Sekä maa jonka turvallisuuspalvelu nitisti hyvissä ajoin kaikenlaisen militantin maanalaisen kommunistisen kumouksellisuuden (tärkeä tekijä syksyä 1944 ajatellen).
70 vuotta jatkosodan päättymisen jälkeen ja missäs Neuvostoliitto on?
Historian roskatynnörissä.
"Suojeluskuntajärjestö, Lotta Svärd ja A.F. Airon luoma aluepuolustusjärjestelmä - liian kova pala neuvostoliittolaiselle luokkasodan doktriinille. "
Ja milläs tavalla ko "liian kova pala" näytti paremuutensa valitun kaupungin lahden jäillä helmi-maaliskuussa -40?
Juoksemalla pakoon?
Harris luottaa siihen, että sekä maalikuussa 1940 että kesällä 1944 perääntynyt / linjojaan taaksepäin vetänyt Suomen armeija olisi ollut puolustuskykyinen.
Varsinkaan 1940 kohdalla en olisi niin varma. Miksi muuten olisi tullut kiire rauhantekoon?
Joka tapauksessa jatkaminen olisi ollut suuresti kuluttavaa sekä hyökkääjälle että puolustajalle.
Tekemällä aselevon 1940 maaliskuussa Suomi ansaitsi itselleen puolentoista vuoden hengähdystauon, jona aikana sota Euroopassa jatkui. Ilman tuota taukoa tuskin olisimme olleet kykeneväisiä jatkamaan sotaa 1941.
oli Suomen kommareille sellainen nyrkinisku nenään, etteivät he ole siitä koskaan toipuneet. Edes nuorempi kommariporukka, joka on syntynyt kymmeniä vuosia sodan jälkeen, ei pääse tämän karvaan tosiasian yli.
"Ja sodan lopputulos
27.11.2014 12:08
oli Suomen kommareille sellainen nyrkinisku nenään..."
Elikä siis se että suomi hävisi erkonsodan oli kova isku suomalaisille komukeille.
Heh, eikös se että suomen talous oli pakotettu tunnustamaan työväenjärjestöt neuvottelukumppaneiksi ollut kova isku suomalaiselle kapitalismille, jonka yli suomalainen kapitalismi ei ole vieläkään päässyt...