Bin Ladenin uskon sota

Long Biography



This document was given to FRONTLINE by a source
close to bin Laden who would like to remain
anonymous. FRONTLINE found it a very useful
source of information, but could not
independently verify much of the information
contained herein. Some of the information is
true. However, some of it runs contrary to
accounts given by other reliable sources. That
said, this document does provide some important
details regarding bin Laden and his family life.




Born 1957 for Syrian mother, Osama bin Laden was
the seventh son among fifty brothers and sisters.





Note: This letter is published here exactly as in
the original translated document given to
FRONTLINE. No changes have been made to grammar
or punctuation.



His father Mohammed Awad bin Laden came to the
kingdom from Hadramout (South Yemen) sometime
around 1930. The father started his life as a
very poor laborer (porter in Jeddah port), to end
up as owner of the biggest construction company
in the kingdom. During the reign of King Saud,
bin Laden the father became very close to the
royal family when he took the risk of building
King Saud's palaces much cheaper than the
cheapest bid. He impressed King Saud with his
performance but he also built good relations with
other members of the royal family, especially
Faisal. During the Saud-Faisal conflict in the
early sixties, bin Laden the father had a big
role in convincing King Saud to step down in
favor of Faisal. After Saud's departure the
treasury was empty and bin Laden was so
supportive to King Faisal that he literally paid
the civil servants' wages of the whole kingdom
for six months. King Faisal then issued a decree
that all construction projects should go to bin
Laden. Indeed, he was appointed for a period as
the minister of public works.

In 1969 the father took the task of rebuilding Al-
Aqsa mosque after the fire incident.
Interestingly the bin Laden family say that they
have the credit of building all the three
mosques, because later on their company took over
the task of major extension in Mecca and Medina
mosques.

The father was fairly devoted Moslem, very humble
and generous. He was so proud of the bag he used
when he was a porter that he kept it as a trophy
in the main reception room in his palace. The
father used to insist on his sons to go and
manage some projects themselves.

The father had very dominating personality. He
insisted to keep all his children in one
premises. He had a tough discipline and observed
all the children with strict religious and social
code. He maintained a special daily program and
obliged his children to follow. At the same time
the father was entertaining with trips to the sea
and desert. He dealt with his children as big men
and demanded them to show confidence at young
age. He was very keen not to show any difference
in the treatment of his children.




Osama was exposed very early on his age to this
experience but he lost his father when he was 13.
He married at the age of 17 to a Syrian girl who
was a relative. He grew up as religiously
committed boy and the early marriage was another
factor of protecting him from corruption.

Osama had his primary, secondary and even
university education in Jeddah. He had a degree
in public administration 1981 from King Abdul-
Aziz university in Jeddah. Countries of the
Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Sudan are the only countries he has been to.
All stories of trips to Switzerland, Philippines,
and London are all unfounded.




In addition to the general Islamic commitment he
started forming an Islamic responsibility at
early age. His father used to host hundreds of
pilgrims during Hajj season from al over the
world. Some of those were senior Islamic scholars
or leaders of Muslim movements. This habit went
on even after his father's death through his
elder brothers. He used to make good contacts and
relations through those gatherings.

At secondary school and university he adopted the
main trend of many educated Muslims at that time,
Muslim Brotherhood. There was a collection of
Muslim scholars in Jeddah and Mecca at that
period. There was nothing extraordinary in his
personality and that trend was rather very non-
confrontational. Interestingly, the 1980 raid in
the Grand Mosque in Mecca was not appealing to
him, neither the theology or that group. He had
two distinguished teachers in Islamic studies,
which was a compulsory subject in the university.
First was Abdullah Azzam who became later as one
of the big names in Afghanistan and the second
was Mohammed Quttub, a famous Islamic writer and
philosopher.




The first encounter with Afghanistan was as early
as the first two weeks of Soviet invasion. He
went to Pakistan and was taken by his hosts
Jamaat Islami from Karachi to Peshawar to see the
refugees and meet some leaders. Some of those
leaders like Rabbani and Sayyaf were common faces
to him because he met them during Hajj gatherings
That trip which was [a] secret trip lasted for
almost a month and was an exploratory rather than
action trip. He went back to the kingdom and
started lobbying with his brothers, relatives and
friends at the school to support the mujahedeen.
He succeeded in collecting huge amount of money
and material as donations to jihad. He made
another trip to take this material. He took with
him few Pakistanis and Afghanis who were working
in bin Laden company for more than ten years.
Again, he did not stay more than a month The trip
was to Pakistan and the border only and was not
to Afghanistan. He went on collecting money and
going in short trips once or twice a year until
1982.




In 1982 he decided to go inside Afghanistan. He
brought with him plenty of the construction
machinery and put them at the disposal of the
mujahedeen He started spending more and more time
in Afghanistan occasionally joining actual
battles but not in an organized manner. His
presence was encouraging to more Saudis to come
but the numbers were still small at that period.




In 1984 he had one further step in strengthening
his presence in Afghanistan by establishing the
guesthouse in Peshawar (Baitul'ansar). That house
was supposed to be the first station of Arab
mujahedeen when they come to Afghanistan before
going to the front or start training. At that
period Osama did not have his own command or
training camps. He used to send the newcomers to
one of the Afghan factions.

The guesthouse establishment was coinciding with
the formation of Jihad Service Bureau by Abdullah
Azzam in Peshawar. The Bureau was very active in
terms of media, publications and charity work.
The Bureau publications were important in
attracting more Saudis and Arabs to Afghanistan.




In 1986 Osama decided to have his own camps
inside Afghanistan and within two years he built
more than six camps. Some were mobilized more
than once. He decided to have his own front and
to run his own battles with his own command.
Among the Arab fighters he had, there were senior
Arab ex-military men from Syria and Egypt with
good military experience. The story of the
guesthouse and the camps was very attractive for
more Arab mujahedeen to come and there was a
significant surge in their numbers at that
period.

In addition to many exchanges of fire and small
operations, the first major battle he had face to
face with the Soviet army with pure Arab
personnel was the battle of Jaji in the province
of Baktia 200 kilometers away from Khost. From
then until 1989 he had more than five major
battles with hundreds of small operations and
exchanges of fire. During the period 1984-1989 he
was staying more in Afghanistan than Saudi
Arabia. He would spend a total of eight months a
year or more in Afghanistan.




In 1988 he noticed that he was backward in his
documentation and was not able to give answers to
some families asking about their loved ones gone
missing in Afghanistan. He decided to make the
matter much more organized and arranged for
proper documentation. He made a tracking record
of the visitors, be they mujahedeen or charity or
simple visitors. Their movement between the
guesthouse and the camps had to be recorded as
well as their first arrival and final departure.
The whole complex was then termed Al-Qa'edah
which is an Arabic word meaning "The Base." Al-
Qa'edah was very much public knowledge. It was
funny to see some people triumphing because they
discovered it!




Late 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan, he went to the kingdom in an
ordinary trip. There he was banned from travel
and was trapped in the kingdom. The Soviet
withdrawal might have been a factor but the main
reason for the travel ban were his intentions to
start a new "front" of jihad in South Yemen. In
addition, he embarrassed the regime by lectures
and speeches warning of impending invasion by
Saddam. At that time the regime was at very good
terms with Saddam. He was instructed officially
to keep low profile and not to give public talks.
Despite the travel ban he was not hostile to
regime at this stage. Indeed he presented a
written advice in the form of a detailed,
personal, private and confidential letter to the
king few weeks before the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait.




He reacted swiftly to Iraqi invasion and saw it
fulfilling his prophecy. He immediately forwarded
another letter to the king suggesting in detail
how to protect the country from potentially
advancing Iraqi forces. In addition to many
military tactics suggested, he volunteered to
bring all the Arab mujahedeen to defend the
kingdom. That letter was presented in the first
few days of the incident, and the regime response
was of consideration!

While he was expecting some call to mobilize his
men and equipment he heard the news which
transferred his life completely. The Americans
are coming. He always describes that moment as
shocking moment. He felt depressed and thought
that maneuvers had to change. Instead of writing
to the king or approaching other members of the
royal family, he started lobbying through
religious scholars and Muslim activists. He
succeeded in extracting a fatwah from one of the
senior scholars that training and readiness is a
religious duty. He immediately circulated that
fatwah and convinced people to have their
training in Afghanistan. It was estimated that
4000 went to Afghanistan in response to the
fatwah. The regime was not happy with his
activities so they limited his movement to Jeddah
only. He was summoned for questioning twice for
some of his speeches and activities and was given
warnings. To intimidate him, the regime raided
his farm in the suburb of Jeddah by the National
Guard. He was not there during the raid and was
very angry when told. He wrote a letter of
protest to Prince Abdullah. Abdullah apologized
and claimed he is not aware and promised to
punish who ever were responsible.




Osama was fed up with this almost house arrest
situation and did not imagine himself able to
stay in the country with the American forces
around. One of his brothers was very close to
King Fahad and also close to Prince Ahmed, deputy
minister of interior. He convinced his brother
that he needed to leave the country to sort out
some business matters in Pakistan and come back.
There was a difficult obstacle, the stubborn
Prince Nayef, minister of interior. His brother
waited until Nayef went in a trip outside the
kingdom and extracted lifting the ban from prince
Ahmed. When he arrived in Pakistan around April
1991 he sent a letter to his brother telling him
that he is not coming back and apologized for
letting him down with the royal family.







After his arrival to Pakistan he went straight to
Afghanistan because he knew the Pakistani
intelligence would hand him back to the Saudis.
There, he attended the collapse of the communist
regime and the consequent dispute between the
Afghan parties. He spent great effort to
arbitrate between them but with no success He
ordered his followers to avoid any involvement in
the conflict and told them it was a sin to side
with any faction. During his stay the Saudis
tried more than once to kidnap or kill him in
collaboration with the Pakistani intelligence.
His friends in the Saudi and Pakistani
establishments would always leak the plan and
make him ready for it. After his failure in
sorting the Afghani dispute, he decided to leave
Afghanistan. The only alternative country he had
was Sudan. He left Afghanistan disguised in
private jet only few months after his arrival.
That was late 1991.




His choice of Sudan had nothing to do with jihad
or "terrorism." He was attracted to Sudan because
of what was at that time an Islamic banner raised
by the new regime in Sudan. He wanted to have
good refuge as well as help the government in its
construction projects. There was no intention
from his side or from the Sudanese regime to have
any military activity in Sudan. Indeed the
Sudanese government refused even sending some of
his followers to the front in the south. He was
treated in Sudan as a special guest who wanted to
help Sudan when everybody was turning away. In
Sudan he mobilized a lot of construction
equipment and enrolled himself in busy
construction projects. He spent good effort in
convincing Saudi businessmen to invest in Sudan
and had reasonable success. Many of his brothers
and Jeddah merchants had and still have
investment in real estate, farming and
agricultural industry. In Sudan he had again
escaped an assassination attempt which turned out
later to be the plan of Saudi intelligence.




During his stay in Sudan anti-American incidents
happened in Somalia and South Yemen. Neither of
the two incidents was performed by his group in
the proper sense of chain of command. Both were
performed by people who had training in
Afghanistan and had enough anti-American drive.
He might have given some sanctioning to the
operations but one thing was certain, the
Sudanese were completely unaware of either.




Between his arrival to Sudan and early 1994 he
was not regarded publicly as Saudi opposition and
Saudi citizens were visiting him without too much
precautions. Only the well-informed people would
know that he was classified as enemy to the Saudi
regime. His assets were frozen sometime between
1992 and 1994 but that was not published. The
Saudis decided to announce their hostility early
1994 when they publicized withdrawing his
citizenship.




After long silence and tolerance, bin Laden
replied by issuing a communiqué condemning the
Saudi decision and saying that he does not need
the "Saudi" reference to identify himself and it
is not up to Al-Saud to admit or expel people
from Arabian Peninsula. He then formed together
with activists and scholars from the kingdom a
group called "Advice and Reform Committee" (ARC).
The ARC was, according to its communiqués and
published agenda, a purely political group. The
ARC published around 17 communiqués which might
have contained harsh criticism of the Saudi
regime and plenty of religious rhetoric but never
contained reference for violence or incitment of
violence.




The car bomb in spring 1995 in Riyadh was the
first major anti-American action in the kingdom.
Bin Laden never claimed responsibility, but the
Saudi government tried to link the incident to
bin Laden by showing video confessions of
four "Arab Afghans" involved in the bombing.




Sudan was exposed to huge international pressure
for hosting bin Laden and his followers, and bin
Laden felt that he is becoming an embarrassment
to the Sudanese. Early in 1996 he started making
contacts with his old friends in Afghanistan to
prepare for his reception. He fled Sudan in a
very well planned trip with many of his followers
to go straight to Jalalabad in Eastern
Afghanistan.




When he arrived there, the situation in
Afghanistan was very unsettled between the many
factions, but he had very good relations with all
factions and all would protect him. The area he
arrived to was under control of Yunis Khalis, a
very influential warlord who later on joined
Taliban.




June 1996, after his arrival in Afghanistan was
the Khobar bombing. Nobody claimed
responsibility, but sources from inside the Saudi
ministry of interior confirmed involvement of
Arab Afghans, with possible link to bin Laden The
Saudi government wanted to frame Shi'a, at the
beginning but Americans were very suspicious of
the Saudi story. Bin Laden himself never claimed
responsibility but gave many hints that he might
have been involved. The Saudi government has
acknowledged recently that bin Laden's men were
behind the bombing.



After few months of his arrival he issued his
first anti-American message, a Declaration of
War. That declaration was limited to expelling
American forces outside the Arabian Peninsula.
His sense of security and nobody to embarrass
must have been the drive to release that 12 page
declaration. Interest in him by the Saudis never
stopped and they tried very hard to convince
Yunis Khalis to hand him over, and he flatly
refused despite the luxurious offers.




Taliban swept Jalalabad late 1996, almost without
war, and bin Laden came under their control. He
was optimistic that they will give him sanctuary
but he was not sure. He was surprised when a
delegation of Taliban came to meet him by order
of Mullah Omer, the leader of Taliban, with
instructions to reassure him that he will have
even better protection under Taliban. The
delegation expressed Taliban honor of protecting
somebody like him who sacrificed a lot for the
sake of jihad.




The Saudis never gave up. Early 1997 they bought
some mercenaries in the Pakistani Afghani border.
The operation was arranged with the Pakistani
intelligence. The information leaked to bin Laden
and he decided to move immediately to Qandahar,
the stronghold of Taliban. The operation was then
cancelled.




When bin Laden left Jalalabad, he ordered many of
his followers to join Taliban in their war
against Dostum and to protect Kabul. The
unexpected happened. Taliban troops were fooled
by a trap in the north and Kabul front was
exposed to Shah Masood. Taliban were so
disorganized at that stage that it was only those
few Arabs who were there to push Shah Masood off
Kabul and they did efficiently.




The leader of Taliban Mulla Omer was keen to meet
Osama. He met him early 1997 after two TV
interviews, Channel 4 and CNN. Mulla Omer
expressed respect and admiration but requested
him to have low profile. He stressed that that
was a request and not an order. Osama replied
with appreciation and thanks and reassured Mulla
Omer that he was going very low profile.




Sometime in late 1997 a big operation was planned
by the Americans. The primary plan was for
American special forces to attack bin Laden's
residence in Qandahar and kidnap him in a
commando style operation. The plan was mocked in
Pakistani desert and proved dangerous. While the
Americans were reconsidering the decision, the
news leaked to bin Laden, again through the
Pakistani military, and he made it public. That
was published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi in London. The
Americans had no choice but to cancel. Americans
acknowledged this incident only recently, but did
not acknowledge the leak.




Bin Laden noticed that the driving force in
Taliban were Ulema (religious scholars). He made
very good links with them and lobbied
specifically for the subject of American forces
in the Arabian Peninsula. He was able to extract
a fatwah signed by some 40 scholars in
Afghanistan sanctioning the use of all means to
expel the American forces from the Peninsula. The
issue of that fatwah was an asset to him inside
Taliban domain. He felt that Ulema were at his
back and he can go high profile after long
silence.




His second presence in Afghanistan has attracted
many mujahedeen to move there again. Among those
were Ayman El-Zawahery of Egyptian Jihad and
Rift'ee Taha of Jama'a Islamia. There was also
new phenomenon during that period. Bin Laden
decided to go pan-Islamic instead of Saudi or
Arabic. He attracted Kashmiris, Pakistanis,
Indians, and Muslims from the Soviet Republics.
He thought at that stage that he could make an
international alliance against America. In
February 1998 he declared the formation of the
International Front. The declaration contained
two elements, formation of the front and a fatwah
sanctioning killing Americans and Jews. Apart
from two Arabic newspapers, the declaration had
minimal coverage by the press.




After avoiding the media for almost a year he
decided to open the door wide for them. In April
1998 he received the ABC TV team and two weeks
later he held press conference in Khost and
warned of impending attack in few weeks time.
Mulla Omer was not happy with this new media
escalation, but felt it difficult to control him
while he is protected by the scholars. Indeed bin
Laden said that he would abide with what ever the
Ulema board decides




The bombings in Kenya and Tanzania July 1998 were
not a big surprise. Yes, it was a surprise but in
terms of choice of location and targets. Despite
his declaration of war against America anywhere,
the attack was expected inside Saudi Arabia.
Having said that, it is not [to be taken] for
granted that he is behind the bombing.




It is not known why the Americans chose a camp in
Khost to retaliate. The camp was an almost
deserted camp where only few Arabs have stayed,
with a neighboring camp of Kashmiris. Bin Laden
himself was hundreds of miles away, and the rest
of Arab Afghans were in the northern front
celebrating their recent victories.




Since the American attack bin Laden was put in
heavy protection and advised to stay hiding. His
followers made another credit when they protected
Kabul front again and pushed Masood forces back.




Bin Laden was brought up with good manners. He
matured as extremely humble and very generous
person. He insists to join his comrades in every
act. Very frequently he cooks for them and serves
them. He lives a simple life in a small flat in
Jeddah or in a shed in Afghanistan and insists on
his family to eat simple and to dress simple.

He is known to be strictly truthful and would
never lie, but he is politically conscious and
believes there is a room for political maneuver
even if you are devoted person. Despite being shy
he has dominating personality. He speaks very
little and looks serious most of the time. He
would appear with a soft smile but he seldom
laughs. His followers see a lot of aura on him
and show great voluntary respect to him. For some
reason that falls short of a proper charisma. He
is not known for giving distinguished speeches,
and there is almost no audio or video recordings
of him.

He is widely educated and spends a good deal of
time reading. He is fond of media monitoring and
information gathering and research. There was
always a data management team with him wherever
he went.

Among the outstanding features is his courage. He
will not show a flicker even if a bomb exploded
near him. He was exposed to more than 40
incidents of heavy bombardment, three of them
were full of death and flesh around him. A Scud
missile exploded 17 meters distance from him. At
one time he was almost the victim of chemical
weapons. More than once he needed treatment in
hospital for body injuries. Despite this courage
he is very cautious person. He would not keep any
electronic instrument close to his vicinity. Some
times he even avoids any device even if it is a
simple watch near him because he believes this
might help in targeting him.

He is intelligent and has reasonable strategic
thinking, but he downgrades himself in the
presence of Islamic scholars. He always admires
Shiekh Safar al-Hawali and would have not gone
through his current controversial path if al-
Hawali was free. Some people saw him as a man
with vision, others doubt it. They think that he
never had clear long term plan. They see the last
fatwah as evidence of that.




Contrary to what is always reiterated bin Laden
has never had official relations with the Saudi
regime or the royal family. All his contacts
would happen through his brothers. The brothers
would approach two members of the royal family
who were fairly sympathetic to Osama. They were
Ahmed bin Abdul Aziz, deputy minister of interior
and Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Aziz, deputy minister
of defense. He might have met them in few
occasions but those meetings would have been
purely social or accidental in one of his
brother's houses. Specifically he had no relation
with Turki al-Faisal head of Saudi intelligence.
He used to be very suspicious of his role in
Afghanistan and once had open confrontation with
him in 1991 and accused him of being the reason
of the fight between Afghan factions. He was wary
of the Saudi government very early in the
eighties, but he thought it was wiser to keep
silent and benefit from their de facto support to
jihad in that period.




Bin Laden has never had any relation with America
or American officials. Claims of relation with
CIA or other American departments are all
unfounded. Since the late seventies he had strong
anti-American feeling. He committed himself and
family and advised all friends to avoid buying
American goods unless it was necessary. He was
saying very early in the eighties that the next
battle is going to be with America. ... No aid or
training or other support have ever been given to
bin Laden from Americans. Bin Laden would bring
money from individuals donating straight to him.
The weapons he had were either captured from the
Soviets or bought from other factions.




Again there were no official relations with
officials in Pakistani government. However, he
had paramount respect by many Pakistanis
including people in the army, intelligence and
religious establishment. They were so penetrating
that they would always leak any plan against him
by the Pakistani-Saudi-American alliance.




His relation with Taliban would best be
understood if Taliban themselves are understood
properly. First of all Taliban are not simply
another Afghan faction supported by Pakistan.
Taliban are sincere to their beliefs, a
religiously committed group unspoiled by
political tactics. They would never bargain with
what they see as matters of principle. Bin Laden
for them is a saint. He is a symbol of sacrifice
for the sake of jihad. They see him as very rich
Arab from the Holy Land who gave up his wealth
and luxury to fight for the sake of his brother
Muslims in Afghanistan. They see themselves
performing a double duty here, an Islamic duty of
protecting this distinguished person and a tribal
duty of protecting a descent refugee. The latter
is a big value in Afghanistan. Once, a Taliban
leader said to a Saudi envoy that if a goat would
seek refuge to my tent I would never hand it
over, how on earth do you want us to hand over a
holy man like bin Laden?

There was no argument within Taliban about
handing over bin Laden. There is however some
difference in opinion about how high his media
profile should be.

In addition to the factor of principle, bin Laden
had twice had the credit of protecting Kabul
recently.

Bin Laden became an intimate part of Taliban
structure when he taught them how to deal with
state affairs in a proper manner. For example,
they were to be fooled by some oil and gas
companies and sell the pipeline project for
cheap. He advised them to learn from the Iraq-
Turkey and Iraq-Syria agreements. They wanted to
privatize some factories and were about to sell
them to Pakistani businessmen for cheap prices.
He taught them how to conduct proper bidding
procedure and guarantee good prices.




It is needless to say that bin Laden has not had
any relation with Iran. Iran knows that bin Laden
is a committed Sunni and he regards Iran as Shi'a
state. The trust between the two is minimal but
both have avoided criticizing each other
publicly. Having said that, he sees America as
common enemy and according to a Pakistani
newspaper he regards an anti-American alliance
with Iran and China as something to be
considered.




bin Laden has two circles of followers. First are
the closed core followers who are related to him
by a chain of command and take orders like a
secret organization. Most of those are probably
in Afghanistan. Many are inside Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Somalia and probably Gulf countries. Like
any secret group, those followers would not
disclose their relation. Inside Saudi Arabia many
of those would appear like any average citizen.
The number of those is probably in hundreds.

The second circle is much wider and the number is
probably in thousands. They are located in the
same countries. They would look at bin Laden as
Godfather but they do not have proper chain of
command or secret links with him. They would
regard themselves obliged to perform some of his
general o